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We revisit anthropic arguments purporting to explain the measured value of the cosmological
constant. We argue that different ways of assigning probabilities to candidate universes lead to
totally different anthropic predictions. As an explicit example, we show that weighting different
universes by the total number of possible observations leads to an extremely small probability for
observing a value of Λ equal to or greater than what we now measure. We conclude that anthropic
reasoning within the framework of probability as frequency is ill–defined and that in the absence of
a fundamental motivation for selecting one weighting scheme over another the anthropic principle
cannot be used to explain the value of Λ, nor, likely, any other physical parameters.
PACS numbers: 98.80.-k
One of the main goals of physics has been to explain the
laws of nature from fundamental principles, such as the
existence and breaking of symmetries. This program has
so far been carried out with great success and attempts
are being made to expand it to explain the values of the
dimensionless constants that arise in our theories. Sev-
eral of the most outstanding “problems” in fundamental
physics of the last decades have been how to explain par-
ticularly deviant dimensionless numbers: the tiny ratio
of the weak energy scale to the Planck mass (“the gauge
hierarchy problem”), the large entropy of the universe
(“the entropy problem”), the tiny value of the geometric
curvature of space in Planck units when evolved back to
the Planck time (“the flatness problem”) and the incred-
ibly low energy density of the vacuum compared to the
characteristic Planck energy density ( “the cosmological
constant problem”).
As an alternative to explanation from fundamental
principles, a form of probabilistic reasoning known as the
“anthropic principle” has become popular, especially as
applied to the cosmological constant problem [1]. The
argument can be summarized as follows. One assumes
that the values taken on in our Universe by the con-
stants of Nature are just one realization of a statistical
ensemble. This ensemble may be thought of as causally
disconnected patches of this Universe, as separate sub–
universes (a.k.a. the multiverse) or as a superposition
of states (in quantum cosmology). Given some a priori
distribution of the values of the fundamental constants
across the ensemble, the probability for a “typical” ob-
server to measure a certain value of one or more of these
constants is usually taken to be proportional to the num-
ber of observers (or the number of observers per baryon)
that develop in a universe with that value. Values of the
fundamental constants that are incompatible with the de-
velopment of intelligent life will never be observed. In the
case of the cosmological constant Λ, or equivalently the
vacuum energy density ρΛ, this selection effect is claimed
to successfully predict ρΛ comparable to what is actually
observed, ie ρΛ/M
4
Pl ≈ 10−123 [1].
As we cannot determine the actual number (density)
of observers in our own Universe, not to mention in some
hypothetical universe with different constants of nature,
a more readily calculated surrogate is used – the physi-
cal number density of galaxies. We may question whether
this is indeed the appropriate weighting factor. For one
thing, since it is a function of time, we must choose when
to evaluate it. For another, we might be concerned that
it fails to differentiate between universes in which a typ-
ical galaxy lasts for a very short time (say one which
recollapses after a billion years) and universes in which
a typical galaxy persists for a very long time (perhaps
trillions of years, or longer).
We shall therefore argue that there are other plausible
weighting factors for universes, and that the answers to
questions such as the expected value of Λ depends enor-
mously on the weighting.As an example, we introduce
a weighting scheme based on the maximal number of al-
lowed observations (MANO) in a universe. This quantity
is clearly relevant to the expected value of a constant, say
Λ, since a value that allows more observations to be car-
ried out will be measured more often. It also has the
advantage of being time-independent. In this Letter, we
show that in this approach the anthropically predicted
probability of measuring ρΛ to be greater than or equal
to the currently inferred value, in a universe otherwise
similar to our own, is ∼ 10−5, in marked contrast to
the usual result. The result also depends on other quan-
tities that are effectively unknowable because they de-
scribe complex emergent phenomena. However, even in
the very optimistic case of an early emergence of intel-
ligent life, the probability of measuring a large Λ is still
∼ 5 · 10−4.
While we do not argue that our probabilistic weighting
scheme is better than the traditional one, it is certainly
no worse. Since the conclusions one derives depend enor-
mously on which weighting scheme one uses, we conclude
that anthropic reasoning based on such frequency argu-
ments is ill–defined. It cannot be used to explain the
value of Λ, nor, likely, any other physical parameters.
2We focus on the case where only the cosmological con-
stant varies from one realization to another. We keep
fixed all other fundamental constants, as well as all re-
maining cosmological parameters. This approach has
been widely used in the literature. (See [2] for a discus-
sion of how the situation changes when more parameters
are varied.)
As described above, the value that Λ takes on in our
Universe is seen as the outcome of a sampling from a fun-
damental probability distribution f(Λ). The probability
of observing a specific value Λ is then
fobs(Λ) = f(Λ)fsel(Λ). (1)
fsel(Λ) is the probability of the observation. It encap-
sulates the selection effects, giving different weights to
different universes. There are at least two shortcomings
to this approach (see also [3]).
The first point is that the very concept of probabil-
ity as a limiting frequency of outcomes, though natural
when applied to repeatable experiments, is not obviously
applicable to the whole Universe. One solution is to use
ergodic arguments to derive f [4]. The validity of this
approach remains unproven. More radical is the mul-
tiverse scenario, according to which there is an infinite
collection of, by definition inaccessible, universes. This
approach hardly seems economical. It is difficult to see
how vastly increasing the number of universes could help
determine the properties of the one Universe we actually
observe. We will not address issues relating to f any fur-
ther, but will make the usual assumption that f(Λ) is
flat within the region where fsel is non–vanishing.
The second aspect is that the selection effect probabil-
ity fsel is strongly dependent on the way one chooses to
give weight to different universes. We introduce below a
new possibility, namely the maximum possible number of
observations (MANO) over the entire life of the universe.
This concept has the advantage of being time–invariant,
as opposed to e.g. the number of observers at any given
time. All the different choices for fsel (including MANO)
suffer from an acute dependence on poorly understood
micro–physical processes involved in the evolution of life,
especially of conscious beings interested in making ob-
servations of the fundamental constants. Our approach
does not claim to significantly improve over other treat-
ments in this respect, but it stands conceptually at least
on equal footing. The fact that our calculation gives
an exceedingly small probability for Λ to be at least as
large as the measured value, while others weightings give
larger probabilities, is to be seen as an inherent failure of
generic anthropic arguments.
We wish to evaluate the probability that an observer
will measure his or her universe to have a vacuum en-
ergy density no smaller than what we measure in our
Universe. For illustrative purposes and computability,
we hold fixed all parameters of the universe other than
the vacuum energy density, considering flat Lemaitre-
Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universes with exactly the
same matter and radiation contents and the same fluctua-
tions as our own at the time of matter–radiation equality.
This is a common setup in the literature, together with
the assumption that the number of observers is propor-
tional to the baryon fraction in halos (even though [4, 5]
showed that this result is critically dependent on fixing
all other parameters). Below we show that even within
this very restricted class of models, the result is com-
pletely dependent on the selection function one chooses.
We consider only the case Λ > 0. This restriction can
only increase the probability of observing Λ equal to or
greater than the observed one, so we should interpret the
probability we calculate as an upper limit.
As the selection function for observing Λ in the differ-
ent realizations we put forward the total number of ob-
servations that observers can potentially carry out over
the entire life of that universe (called MANO for brevity,
for “Maximum Allowed Number of Observations”). This
maximum number is the product of two factors – the
number of observers and the maximum number of obser-
vations that each observer can make.
There is a fundamental difficulty in determining the
total number of observers, since we can neither compute
nor measure it. We might argue, as is usually done, that
it is proportional to the number of galaxies, but the pro-
portionality factor could be very large, incredibly small
or anywhere in between. Indeed, if we require, as it seems
we must, that our observers be sufficiently intelligent to
make an observation of Λ, then it is not clear that we even
know how to define our criteria, never mind compute the
probability per galaxy per unit time of meeting those
criteria. However, in the limit where observers are rare
(in a way we quantify below) the anthropic prediction
for the probability of observing Λ will be independent
of the density of observers. We therefore choose instead
to focus on the second factor – the maximum number of
observations that each observer can make.
In a Λ > 0 universe, the minimum temperature at
which a system (e.g. an observer) can operate is the de
Sitter temperature TdS = ρ
1/2
Λ /(2πMPl). (Refrigerated
subsystems can run cooler, but the energy consumption
of the refrigeration more than compensates.)
As discussed in detail in [6], the maximum energy an
observer can ever collect is
Emax ∝ min
(
4π
3
[(η∞ − η⋆)a⋆]3 , n−1obs
)
ρm(a⋆). (2)
Here η⋆ is the conformal time when the observer starts
collecting, while at conformal time η∞, a(η∞) = ∞.
There are O(1) geometric prefactors that we ignore to
focus on the functional dependence of Eq. (2). The n−1obs
term in (2) represents the cutoff in Emax due to com-
petition with other observers. We consider the case of
“rare observers” – when there is at most one observer
3within the comoving volume accessible to each from the
time that they first become capable of making observa-
tions onward. We ignore this cutoff and focus on the first
term.
The number of thermodynamic processes (such as ob-
servations of Λ) an observer can carry out is maximized if
the observer saves up Emax until the universe has reached
the de Sitter temperature. Thus
Nmax ≤ Emax/kBTdS. (3)
Following the arguments given above, we adopt Nmax as
a probabilistic weight in the selection function.
We start from the Friedman equation for a flat universe
containing cosmological constant, radiation and pressure-
less matter (both baryonic and cold dark matter)
(
a′
a
)2
=
8πG
3
(ρΛ + ρm + ρr) (4)
(where a prime denotes derivative with respect to confor-
mal time η). We define RL† to be the ratio of the vacuum
energy density in the sample universe we are considering
to the total energy density at matter–radiation equal-
ity, where L† ≡ (Ω†Λ)eq is the value of this ratio in our
own Universe. (Throughout, quantities with dagger su-
perscripts are the values measured in our Universe). We
assume that the cosmological constant is always negligi-
ble at matter–radiation equality, i.e. we limit our anal-
ysis to the regime R ≪ 109. Finally, we normalize the
scale factor at matter–radiation equality, aeq ≡ 1, and
set α ≡ a/aeq. It will prove useful to note that
L† =
1
2
(
Ω†Λ
)
0
(
1−
(
Ω†Λ
)
0
)−1
α−30 ≈
3
2
α−30 , (5)
where quantities subscripted with a 0 are as measured in
our Universe today and α0 ∼ 3000. In the last equality
we have used that
(
Ω†Λ
)
0
≈ 3/4, which we take hence-
forth as an equality.
With the above definitions, we readily compute
aeqHeq(η∞ − η⋆) =
∫ ∞
α⋆
α−2dα√
RL† + 1
2
(α−3 + α−4)
. (6)
The matter and radiation energy densities are α−3/2 and
α−4/2 respectively because we assumed we can ignore
Λ at matter–radiation equality. Heq is the value of the
Hubble parameter at equality. (So Heq = H†eq.) Notice
that having neglected Λ at equality does not affect our
results, since the time at which observers evolve (denoted
by a subscript ⋆) is presumably much later than equality,
α⋆ ≫ 1. We can also neglect the term proportional to
α−1 in (6), and we can then solve analytically the Fried-
man equation for a as a function of physical time t (as
opposed to conformal time η), and so obtain
α⋆ = α0 (3R)
−1/3 sinh
(
ln(
√
3 + 2)
√
Rτ
)2/3
. (7)
We have introduced τ ≡ t⋆/t†0, the time until observers
smart enough to begin collecting energy arise, in units of
13.7 Gyrs, the age at which such observers (us, or our
descendants) are known to have arisen in our Universe.
Before proceeding to a numerical evaluation of (6), it
is instructive to look at its asymptotic limits. For the
maximum number of observations, Eq. (3), we find
Nmax ∝
{
2
3
(α0/α⋆)
3
R−2, R≫ 1,
54R−1, R≪ 1. (8)
Following Eq. (1), we identify fsel(Λ) ∝ Nmax(R). Since
we have assumed that f(Λ) is flat in Λ (and hence in
R), we have fobs ∝ Nmax. (This is the essence of our
MANO weighting.) We see from (8) that fobs is a steeply
decreasing function of R. Consequently, there is only
a small anthropically conditioned probability that Λ is
larger than we observe, ie
p(R ≥ 1|τ) ≃
∫ ∞
1
fobs(R; τ)≪ 1. (9)
The probability p(R ≥ 1|τ) can be estimated by normal-
izing fobs approximately by integrating (8) up to R = 1.
However, fobs ∝ R−1 as R→ 0, so the normalization in-
tegral diverges logarithmically, and is dominated by the
minimum cut–off value, Rmin, if such exists. In the land-
scape scenario (see e.g. [7] and references therein), for
instance, the number of vacua is estimated to be of order
10500, and therefore the corresponding minimum value of
Λ can perhaps be taken to be Λmin ∼ 10−500M4Pl. This
gives Rmin ∼ 10−377 or
p(R ≥ 1|τ = 1) ∼ 8 · 10−6. (10)
This means that a low–Λ universe is more probable than
one with the value of Λ that we observe.
In Figure 1, we plot the value of fobs(R|τ) for a few
values of τ around 1. The probability of measuring a
value of R ≥ 1 is very small, being 9 ·10−6 for τ = 1 (this
value is computed numerically) and falling to 4 ·10−12 for
τ = 10. The situation is only marginally better if intelli-
gent observers evolve before one–tenth of the current age
of the universe, since for τ = 0.1 fobs(R|τ) = 5 · 10−4.
So far, we have worked exclusively in the rare observer
limit – where each intelligent observer is free to collect
all of the energy within their apparent horizon without
competition from other observers. One might imagine
that as the density of observers rose, one would mitigate
the preference for low Λ, but the case is by no means so
clear. If the observer density is high, then the observers
will come into competition for the universe’s (or at least
their Hubble volume’s) same scarce resources. Our own
historical experience is that such competition never leads
to negotiated agreement to use those resources as con-
servatively as possible. More likely is that the competi-
tion for resources will lead to some substantial fraction
4FIG. 1: Anthropically predicted probability density distribu-
tion as a function of R, the ratio of the cosmological constant
in another part of the multiverse to the value it takes in our
Universe, in our MANO scheme and for different values of the
parameter τ controlling the cosmic time when intelligent life
emerges (in units of 13.7 Gyrs, with τ = 1 being the case of
our Universe). The probability of observing a value of Λ equal
to or greater than what we measure (dashed vertical line) is
very small as all the weight lies close the the minimum value.
of those resources being squandered in warfare until only
one of the observers remains. Moreover, unless they elim-
inate all possible competitors, observers will continue to
spend their finite supply of energy at a rate exceeding
that which would otherwise be necessary. What is clear
is that given our inability to predict or measure either
the density of intelligent observers or the way in which
they would behave when they meet, our ability to use
anthropic reasoning can only be further compromised.
It is interesting to note that the rare observer limit
would be better described as a rare civilization limit,
since the individual observers need not be rare, but only
the groups of them that act collectively. In this case, we
could attempt to pass from weighting by the number of
possible observations to weighting by the number of ob-
servers (although throughout all time). In the simplest
case, where the number of observations that a civiliza-
tion makes during its existence is a constant, the trans-
lation is trivial – the two weighting schemes are identical.
However, one can easily imagine that this number grows
or decreases with time in a way that we cannot possi-
bly predict. Moreover, one would still have to solve the
formidable problem of calculating the number density of
civilizations.
We have argued that anthropic reasoning suffers from
the problem that the peak of the selection function de-
pends on the details of what exactly one chooses to condi-
tion upon – be it the number of observers, the fraction of
baryons in halos or the total number of observations ob-
servers can carry out. Whereas a weighting proportional
to the number density of galaxies implies that the ex-
pected value of Λ is close to what we observe, the weight-
ing scheme we propose – according to the maximum num-
ber of possible observations – implies that the expected
value of Λ is logarithmically close to its minimum allowed
non–negative value (or is zero or negative). In its usual
formulation, the anthropic principle does not offer any
motivation – from either fundamental particle physics or
probability theory – to prefer one weighting scheme over
another. Ours is only one specific example out of many
possible weighting schemes one might imagine (see e.g. [8]
for an example involving holographic arguments). Since
neither weighting scheme (nor any of the many others
one can imagine) is clearly the correct one from a prob-
ability theory point of view (meaning one that does not
lead to paradoxical or self–contradictory conclusions of
the type described in [9]), we must conclude that an-
thropic reasoning cannot be used to explain the value of
the cosmological constant. We expect that similar state-
ments apply to any conclusions that one would like to
draw from anthropic reasoning.
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